Cowen wishes the book better 'distinguish[ed] the preferences of the (often ill-informed) poor across means and ends.' He argues that 'the poor' (a presumably monolithic bloc) will advocate for conflicting goals, such as tariffs to protect their jobs and 'prosperity.' Their positions are in conflict because, as Cowen would have it, they are too dumb to know otherwise. This, however, assumes that the Cowen-Poor are advocating for a universal prosperity, which may not always be the case. If most people vote to increase their own well-being (a point that Cowen admittedly does not concede), then there are no conflicting positions.
This casual belief that their opponents are ill-informed or mentally deficient is a staple of libertarian orthodoxy. Remember that Ron Paul has suggested that the fact that a relatively low proportion of African Americans subscribe to free-market fundamentalism is evidence of their genetically inferior intellect. Cowen seems to extend this odd and dangerous worldview to poor people.
Cowen's alternative hypothesis includes the assertion that 'Wealthier voters are better educated and smarter...' I think the notion that 'wealthier voters are better educated' is relatively uncontroversial. (I'll leave aside for the now the fact that this is precisely how wealthier voters want it.) 'Smarter' is just baffling, however. This idea seems to be going down John Galt Drive right on to the Joel Osteen Parkway, which is a road most sane and moral people avoid at all cost.
Cowen then tries a Socratic approach. The result may be more Freudian, however.
I would be falling prey to the fallacy of mood affiliation if I simply assumed the author wanted policy to be more responsive to the wishes of the poor and middle class. Still I can ask whether this would be a desirable end. Aren’t they less educated and less well-informed on average? Don’t they also care about politics less and derive less of their status from political processes and outcomes? Do I want them to have a greater say over social issues, including gay marriage? No.
Cowen has indeed set the bar rather low, but he's certainly crashed into it this time. While I'm sure he'd like to think that his are bold and innovative ideas, they are in fact over 120 years old.
It's not hard to imagine that those to whom the status quo has been so generous would be so uncomfortable with the meaningful suffrage of ordinary people; the staggering part is that he'd reveal it so casually.
It's also important to remember that this is not economics. There are questions Cowen raises here that are framed in terms of economics (trade-offs, optimization), but this is simply heavy-handed social engineering. It's important to remember that libertarians' fear of democracy is at the heart of their fear of government.
In the 1977 television series The Age of Uncertainty, John Kenneth Galbraith noted that the oligarchs of the Gilded Age would be unwelcome in the corridors of power and the playgrounds of the powerful in the 1970s. He felt that the standards of that time were such that the original Rockefellers, Morgans, Hearsts, and others would be seen as crude and crass.
Our twenty-first-century oligarchs may not be as uncouth as the lords of industry of yore, but it hardly matters when they've got such an accommodating and reverent stable of willing academics.
I do not follow Tyler Cowen, but I will respond to one statement by Jonas that catches my attention.
ReplyDelete"This casual belief that their opponents are ill-informed or mentally deficient is a staple of libertarian orthodoxy."
From my personal experience as a libertarian, I can confirm the "ill-informed" part of this statement. I believe that non-libertarians do not know how I as a libertarian see and interpret events. I believe this because non-libertarians frequently get it wrong, when they are attempting to summarize the views of libertarians.
When I am faced with an opposite who obviously has a different worldview, and when I would like to believe that I am able to grasp my opposite's worldview, I challenge myself this way. Can I speak about some controversial issue in the language of my opposite, conveying the ideas and feelings of my opposite so well that my opposite may believe that I join him in his worldview? Will my opposite nod consent to what I have said? If I cannot speak that way, then I suppose there is still something about which I am ill-informed.